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Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are playing an overarching role in the disinformation phenomenon our
world is currently facing. Such systems boost the problem not only by increasing opportunities to create
realistic AI-generated fake content, but also, and essentially, by facilitating the dissemination of disinfor-
mation to a targeted audience and at scale by malicious stakeholders. This situation entails multiple ethical
and human rights concerns, in particular regarding human dignity, autonomy, democracy, and peace. In
reaction, other AI systems are developed to detect and moderate disinformation online. Such systems do not
escape from ethical and human rights concerns either, especially regarding freedom of expression and
information. Having originally started with ascending co-regulation, the European Union (EU) is now
heading toward descending co-regulation of the phenomenon. In particular, the Digital Services Act proposal
provides for transparency obligations and external audit for very large online platforms’ recommender
systems and content moderation. While with this proposal, the Commission focusses on the regulation of
content considered as problematic, the EU Parliament and the EU Council call for enhancing access to
trustworthy content. In light of our study, we stress that the disinformation problem is mainly caused by the
business model of the web that is based on advertising revenues, and that adapting this model would reduce
the problem considerably. We also observe that while AI systems are inappropriate to moderate disinforma-
tion content online, and even to detect such content, they may be more appropriate to counter the
manipulation of the digital ecosystem.
Policy Significance Statement
This study aims at identifying the right approach to tackle the disinformation problem online with due
consideration for ethical values, fundamental rights and freedoms, and democracy. While moderating content
as such and using AI systems to that end may be particularly problematic regarding freedom of expression and
information, we recommend countering the malicious use of technologies online to manipulate individuals. As
considering the main cause of the effective manipulation of individuals online is paramount, the business model
of the web should be on the radar screen of public regulation more than content moderation. Furthermore, we do
support a vibrant, independent, and pluralistic media landscape with investigative journalists following ethical
rules.
©TheAuthor(s), 2021. Published byCambridgeUniversity Press. This is anOpenAccess article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the
original article is properly cited.
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1. Introduction
Manipulation of truth is a recurring phenomenon throughout history.1Damnatio memoriae, namely the
attempted erasure of people from history, is an example of purposive distortion of reality that was
already practiced in Ancient Egypt. Nevertheless, owing to the rapid advances in information and
communication technologies (ICT) as well as their increasing pervasiveness, disingenuous information
can now be produced easily and in a realistic format, and its dissemination to a targeted audience occurs
at an unparalleled speed and scale, including through artificial intelligence (AI) techniques. The
consequences are serious with far-reaching implications. For instance, the media ecosystem has been
leveraged to influence citizens’ opinion and voting decisions related to the 2016 US presidential
election2 and the 2016 UK referendum on leaving the European Union (EU) (Howard and Kollanyi,
2016). In Myanmar, Facebook has been a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate against
RohingyaMuslims (Human Rights Council, 2018, para 74).3 In India, rumors onWhatsApp resulted in
several murders (Dixit and Mac, 2018). In France, a virulent online campaign on social media against a
professor ended up with him being murdered (Bindner and Gluck, 2020). Conspiracy theories are
currently prospering.4 And presently in the context of the Covid-19, we are facing what has been called
an infodemic5 by the World Health Organization (WHO), with multiple adverse effects on individuals
and society at large.
As commonly understood, disinformation is false, inaccurate or misleading information that is
shared with the intent to deceive the recipient,6 as opposed to misinformation that refers to false,
inaccurate, or misleading information that is shared without any intent to deceive. Whereas new digital
technology and social media have amplified the creation and spread of both mis- and disinformation,
only disinformation has been considered by the EU institutions as a threat that must be tackled by
legislative and technical means.7 This choice of focus has to do with the manipulative character of
disinformation, along with the importance of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, especially
freedom of expression and information.8 Indeed, if anyone or any entity was allowed to decide whose
1 For an historical review of the phenomenon in the EU, see Mork (2020).
2 For an in-depth study on the disinformation phenomenon in the US, see Lance Bennett and Livingston (2020). During the 2016
US election campaign, not only has Cambridge Analytica played an important role in influencing voter’s decisions, but also the
writing of sensationalist stories to earn money from advertising. See for instance the example of the “fake news” farm inMacedonia,
reported by Kirby (2016).
3 The report indicates that “[t]he extent to which Facebook posts andmessages have led to real-world discrimination and violence
must be independently and thoroughly examined.”
As a contributing vector of the possibly large extent to which Facebook was used to spread hate effectively, it is important to note
that in Myanmar, Facebook is considered as the internet for most people. This situation is the result of various factors: the social
network is already installed when buying a phone; in 2016 it released its “Free Basics” program that offers users creating a Facebook
account free access to some pre-selected websites, with the aim to conquer the developing countries; and since people in Myanmar
have been silenced for long, they may have particularly reveled in being able to express themselves and share information on social
media. These elements were discussed in an article of The Economist (2020a). See also the analysis of the situation conducted by the
anthropologist Christina Fink, such as exposed in her article, Fink (2018).
4 QAnon is an example of such conspiracy theory, see Hannah (2021).
5 As defined by the WHO, “infodemics are an excessive amount of information about a problem, which makes it difficult to
identify a solution. They can spreadmisinformation, disinformation, and rumors during a health emergency. Infodemics can hamper
an effective public health response and create confusion and distrust among people.” WHO (2020a). See also WHO (2020b).
6 The European Commission defines disinformation as “verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented, and
disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm. Public harm comprises threats to
democratic political and policy-making processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens’ health, the
environment or security. Disinformation does not include reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news and
commentary.” European Commission (2018d, pp. 3–4). By disseminating disinformation online, malicious stakeholders may for
instance seek to discredit political leaders, tarnish the reputation of a competing firm, or negate facts of public interest with
antidemocratic purposes.
7 See for instance European Commission (2018b). It will be revised and strengthened as announced in the European Democracy
Action Plan, which addresses the fight against disinformation as one of its three pillars. See European Commission (2020b).
8 Freedom of expression and freedom to receive information are set out in article 19 of theUniversal Declaration ofHumanRights
(adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR). They are protected in Europe by article 10 of the Convention for the
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truth should be considered as false and was enabled to regulate content accordingly, freedom of
expression and information would be seriously impaired. The disinformation problem is particular in
the sense that, firstly, the shared information is intentionally deceptive to manipulate people and,
secondly, for achieving his or her goal, its author takes benefit from the modern techniques of
communication and information. For these reasons, our analysis stays on the beaten path, hence the
title of this article referring solely to the disinformation problem. It is also worth specifying that unlike
“fake news,” a term that has been used by politicians and their supporters to dismiss coverage that they
find disagreeable, the disinformation problem encompasses various fabricated information and prac-
tices going beyond anything resembling “news.”9
As indicated, advances in ICT have changed the way information can be produced and disseminated.
What must be noted is the decisive role of AI techniques used in this field. Not only do they facilitate the
creation and dissemination of disinformation bymalicious stakeholders, they are also used contrariwise to
tackle disinformation online. In the present study, we first analyse the different AI techniques that amplify
the disinformation problem. Second, we focus on AI techniques developed in response to this exact same
issue. Ethical implications arise in both cases, which we consider respectively. Third, we discuss the EU
regulation of the phenomenon, which started with ascending co-regulation but is presently heading
toward descending co-regulation. And finally, we conclude our study and recommend future directions to
address the problem ethically, with due consideration for fundamental rights and freedoms.
2. AI Techniques Boost the Creation and Dissemination of Disinformation
AI techniques boost the disinformation phenomenon online in two ways. First, AI techniques are
generating new opportunities to create or manipulate texts and image, audio or video content. Second,
AI systems developed and deployed by online platforms to enhance their users’ engagement significantly
contribute to the effective and rapid dissemination of disinformation online. These latter techniques
constitute the main contributing factor of the problem. Multiple ethical implications arise from this
situation, which should be thoroughly examined.
2.1. AI techniques facilitate the creation of fake content
When AI techniques are used to create fake content, the product is called a deepfake. As highlighted in a
report dealing with technology-enabled disinformation, “[f]alse media has existed for as long as there has
been media to falsify: forgers have faked documents or works of art, teenagers have faked driver’s
licenses, etc. With the advent of digital media, the problem has been amplified, with tools like Photoshop
making it easy for relatively unskilled actors to perform sophisticated alterations to photographs” (Akers
et al., 2018, p. 4).More recently, developments inAI have further expanded the possibilities tomanipulate
texts, images, audios and videos, with the two latter types of content becoming increasingly realistic. The
following definition explains clearly what deepfakes are:
Deepfakes (a portmanteau of deep learning and fake) are the product of two AI algorithms working
together in a so-called Generative Adversarial Network (GAN). GANs are best described as a way
to algorithmically generate new types of data from existing datasets. For example, a GAN could
analyse thousands of pictures of Donald Trump and then generate a new picture that is similar to the
analysed images but not an exact copy of any of them. This technology can be applied to various
types of content—images, moving images, sound, and text. The term deepfake is primarily used for
audio and video content (Walorska, 2020, p. 9).
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) and in the
EU by article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR).
9 These are the two reasonswhy the EuropeanCommission has decided to avoid the term “fake news.”SeeEuropeanCommission
(2018a, p. 10).
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While the manipulation of texts and images was already feasible with less sophisticated tools, the
advent of deepfakes renders the creation of fake videos and audios highly accessible as well. Indeed,
“only a few hundred pictures or audio recordings are required as training data to achieve credible
results. For just under $3, anybody can order a fake video of a person of their choice, provided that they
have at least 250 pictures of that person—but this is unlikely to be an obstacle for any person that uses
Instagram or Facebook. Synthetic voice recordings can also be generated for just $10 per 50 words”
(Walorska, 2020, p. 15). Apart from their entertainment value, the involvement of deepfakes in the
media can adversely affect society. Not only do they fuel the spread of false information, they are also
prone to undermine the credibility of legitimate information, creating doubts about any information
encountered, including when it is given by the traditional press or by governmental administrations. In
the disinformation context, it is therefore possible for anyone willing to deceive or mislead individuals,
to manipulate the truth in two effective ways: fake content can be passed off as real and authentic
information can be passed off as fake.
2.2. AI techniques present on the web boost the dissemination of disinformation
To ensure dissemination of disinformation to a maximum of selected people, micro-targeting is
especially effective. Owing to the economic model of the web based on advertising, tracking methods
using AI technologies were developed by information and communication platforms to enable the
targeting of advertisements to specific consumers for the sake of efficiency. The traditional browser
cookie-based tracking or third-party tracking “is the practice bywhich companies embed content—like
advertising networks, social media widgets, and website analytics scripts—in the first party sites that
users visit directly. This embedding relationship allows the third party to re-identify users across
different websites and build a browsing history” (Akers et al., 2018, p. 4). Browser fingerprinting is
another tracking method, “which relies on browser-specific and OS-specific features and quirks to get a
fingerprint of a user’s browser that can be used to correlate the user’s visits across websites” (Akers
et al., 2018, p. 4). As just said, these methods were developed to target advertisements at potential
consumers. In this respect, “[t]he advertiser usually sets the targeting parameters (such as demographics
and presumed interests), but the platform’s algorithmic systems pick the specific individuals who will
see the ad and determine the ad’s placement within the platform” (Maréchal and Biddle, 2020, p. 13).
Tracking methods are now often used to, more broadly, target particular content at each user. Indeed,
according to the economic model adopted by the major online platforms and websites, which is based on
“the economics of attention” (Festré and Garrouste, 2015), the financing of investments is not done
directly by visitors but rather through the remuneration received from the advertising companies.10
Therefore, more time spent by a user on a platform means more economic gain for the latter. Algorithms
are thus recording every action we take online (which can be active or passive) in order to propose content
that will optimize the time we spend using the platform and to propose products we are most likely to
purchase. Therefore, as outlined by the Council of the EU in its recent conclusions on safeguarding a free
and pluralistic media system, algorithms are “affecting the results that users are actively searching for
(findability) and the media content that users are passively exposed to (discoverability)” (Council of the
European Union, 2020, para 21). This is the business model of the web we are usually not completely
aware of when surfing online.
Since data analysis and algorithms are having an increasing impact on the information shown to
individuals, each of us going online sees a different version of reality. Facebook’s News feed, Twitter’s
Timeline, and YouTube’s recommender system are only some examples of content shaping algorithms
that determine what individual users see online (Maréchal and Biddle, 2020, p. 13). We can also mention
10 For instance, in 2020, Google’s advertising revenue amounted to 146.92 billion US dollars. See https://www.statista.com/
statistics/266249/advertising-revenue-of-google/ (accessed 01March 2021). And Facebook’s advertising revenue amounted to 84.2
billion U.S. dollars. See https://www.statista.com/statistics/267031/facebooks-annual-revenue-by-segment/ (accessed 01 March
2021).
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Netflix’smovie recommender system, Spotify’s recommender system and,more surreptitiously, Google’s
ranking system. Besides privacy concerns raised by the tracking and targeting technologies as well as
concerns regarding people’s autonomy and right to information, this ecosystem can be directly leveraged
by disinformation campaigns to target specific vulnerable users and to create and exploit filter bubbles
(Akers et al., 2018 , p. 5). For instance, there existed until recently on Facebook a pseudoscience interest
category that advertisers could purchase and target (Sankin, 2020), and since AI systems analyse the
unique psychographic and behavioral user profiles, micro-targeting of voters has been boosted by the use
of such technology (Bergamini, 2020, p. 10; Marsden and Meyer, 2019, p. 15).
The design of algorithms based onmicro-targeting can also directly amplify the spread of bothmis- and
disinformation. For example, on YouTube, more than a billion hours of video are viewed every day, 70%
of which by automated systems in order to provide recommendations on what video to watch next for
human users. Since there aremore than two billion users onYouTube, this has a significant impact onwhat
the worldwatches. Yet, as the platform operates for profit, which is optimized by viewing time, the quality
of the recommended content is far from being prioritized. The project AlgoTransparency, which aims at
exposing the impact of the most influential algorithms,11 demonstrates YouTube’s vicious feedback loop.
It can be described as follows: (1) Divisive content performs better! (2) Algorithmic systems promote
this content in order to optimize viewing time ! (3) This kind of content being more viewed, content
creators create more of it.12
The deployment of social bots by malicious stakeholders also contributes to the effective dissemina-
tion of disinformation. These bots (an abbreviation for software robots) are fully or semiautomated user-
accounts operating on social media platforms, which are designed for communication and the imitation of
human online-behavior. There are different types of social bots, ranging “from very simple bots that
automate single elements of the communication process (e.g., liking or sharing), over partially human-
steered accounts with automated elements (so-called hybrid bots, or ‘cyborgs’) to autonomously acting
agents equipped with [AI] and learning skills such asMicrosofts’ Zo1 or Replika.ai” (Assenmacher et al.,
2020). These “artificial speakers,” which are consistently present on social media,13 have a real impact:
they “foment political strife, skew online discourse, and manipulate the marketplace” (Lamo and Calo,
2018). Indeed, such bots can be designed to post context-relevant content based on the community they
are attempting to blend into, and once they have gained a credible profile and seem trustable, they are
capable of disseminating disinformation efficiently (Akers et al., 2018, p. 5).14
2.3. Ethical implications
Disinformation is well a long-standing problem, but given that AI techniques present in the digital
ecosystem create new possibilities to manipulate individuals effectively and at scale, multiple ethical
concerns arise or are exacerbated. These should be carefully considered.
A first ethical value that is challenged by the current digital ecosystem is human dignity.15 Following
this fundamental value, “human beings are to be understood as ends in themselves and never as a means
alone” (EDPS Ethics Advisory Group, 2018). Yet, when algorithms are programmed to adapt what is
shown to individuals based on their profile created through datafication16 in order to optimize
11 See https://www.algotransparency.org/ (accessed 01 March 2021).
12 For a presentation of the project AlgoTransparency and its main findings by the founder Guillaume Chaslot, see the following
video: The Toxic Potential of YouTube’s Feedback Loop (CADETech PolicyWorkshop, 17 November 2019). https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Et2n0J0OeQ8&feature=youtu.be (accessed 01 March 2021).
13 The average presence of bots was estimated to range between 9 and 15% of all Twitter accounts in 2017, and to amount to
approximately 11% of all Facebook accounts in 2019. See Varol et al. (2017) and Zago et al. (2019).
14 For an analysis of which users may be the target of bots’ activities, see Balestrucci (2020).
15 Human dignity is set out in article 1 of theUniversal Declaration ofHumanRights and in article 2 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.
16 Following the definition provided on Wikipedia, “Datafication is a technological trend turning many aspects of our life into
data which is subsequently transferred into information realised as a new form of value.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datafication.
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engagement, regardless of the content’s quality, those individuals are considered as mere means for
economic purposes. Furthermore, those same algorithms can be leveraged by malicious stakeholders to
effectively manipulate their opinion and to reach specific goals thereupon. As explained by the EDPS
Ethics Advisory Group, “[w]hen individuals are treated not as persons but as mere temporary aggregates
of data processed at an industrial scale so as to optimize through algorithmic profiling, administrative,
financial, educational, judicial, commercial, and other interactions with them, they are arguably, not fully
respected, neither in their dignity nor in their humanity” (EDPS Ethics Advisory Group, 2018, p. 17). In
addition, AI techniques present in the digital ecosystem change reality in most cases unbeknownst to the
individuals, expanding opportunities for effective manipulation of their opinion. Indeed, targeted
individuals are rarely aware of the current digital ecosystem, and they usually think that the (dis)
information they see online is objective and universally encountered by other users.
Secondly, the difficulty to access information alongside the pervasiveness of disinformation online
drastically impairs the individuals’ capacity to make free and informed decisions, which is an essential
prerequisite for their autonomy (Poullet, 2020a). The value of autonomy “refers to the capacity of
individuals to construct their own identity, to determine their own ‘good’, their own vision of a good
life in respect of others’ similar capacity, and therefore to contribute fully to collective deliberation” (Free
translation; Poullet, 2020b, p. 93). As observed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Pretty
case,17 this notion of personal autonomy underlies the right to privacy.18 As algorithms make use of
personal data to determine the content that will be shown to each individual and distort their capacity to
decide freely, the right to privacy and data protection19 may be violated.20
Information provides individuals with the capacity to make informed decisions by enabling them to
acquaint themselves with facts and societal challenges, and understand those (Hanot and Michel, 2020,
p. 162). It is therefore a key element of individuals’ autonomy. Yet, when individuals encounter realistic
fake content, when they are enclosed unconsciously or consciously in filter bubbles and “echo chambers,”
and when they are the target of disinformation campaigns that leverage the current digital ecosystem to
effectively manipulate their opinion, their access to information is definitely made harder, which impedes
or at least limits their right to information. The decrease of the average level of trust in the news
worldwide,21 to which the invasiveness of disinformation online has participated, also contributes to
the lack of information that individuals have to deal with.
Since citizens’ capacity to make free and informed decisions is impaired by the digital ecosystem, their
ability to participate in the democratic discourse is also affected. Yet, when individuals’ capacity to
participate fully in public debate is impaired, including through the effectivemanipulation of their opinion
and voting decisions, democracy is seriously jeopardized. Democracy indeed “implies that people with
different views come together to find common solutions through dialogue” (Bergamini, 2020, p. 15).
It is important to note that in order to form their own opinion, individuals need to access diversified
information, namely to be informed in a contradictory way. Receiving information only oriented toward
one point of view is not enough. Alongside disinformation campaigns, echo chambers therefore play a key
role in the threat toward the democratic process. They are generated in consequence of the filter bubbles
created bymicro-targetingmethods, namely content shaping algorithms. An echo chamber can be defined
as “an environment in which individuals encounter only beliefs or opinions that coincide with their own,
17 ECtHR, Pretty v. United Kingdom (Judgment) [2002] Application n°2346/02, para 61.
18 The right to privacy is set out in article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in article 7 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
19 The right to protection of personal data is included in the right to privacy, but it is also explicitly set out in article 8 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In the EU, the GDPR sets out rules aimed at ensuring this right. Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L 119/1 (General Data Protection
Regulation).
20 For further developments regarding the right to privacy and data protection as guarantees of the individuals’ autonomy, see
Poullet (2020b, pp. 114–131).
21 For an analysis of the current level of trust in the media, see Newman et al. (2020).
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so that their existing views are reinforced and alternative ideas are not considered” (Bergamini, 2020,
note 18). Individuals are thus led “into a state of intellectual isolation where there is no place for dialogue
[…] [and,] by prioritizing the news and information which users like, algorithms tend to reinforce their
opinions, tastes and habits, and limiting access to diverging views” (Bergamini, 2020, p. 10). As outlined
by Vincent De Coorebyter, “if we define democracy as a mechanism of construction of compromises
taking account of a large diversity of opinions and demagogy as a method to flatter predetermined ideas,
we can fear that the Internet fosters the secondmore than the first” (free translation; de Coorebyter, 2020).
In 2001, Tim Berners-Lee had already expressed similar concerns regarding the web’s evolution to a
journalist, who reported the related part of the interview as follows: “Berners-Lee, standing at a
blackboard, draws a graph, as he’s prone to do. It arrays social groups by size. Families, workplace
groups, schools, towns, companies, the nation, the planet. The Web could in theory make things work
smoothly at all of these levels, as well as between them. That, indeed, was the original idea—an organic
expanse of collaboration. But the Web can pull the other way. And Berners-Lee worries about whether it
will ‘allow cranks and nut cases to find in the world 20 or 30 other cranks and nut cases who are absolutely
convinced of the same things. Allow them to set up filters around themselves… and develop a pothole of
culture out of which they cannot climb.’Will we ‘end up with a world which is full of very, very disparate
cultures which do not talk to each other?’” (Wright, 2001). In 2019, he added that “we have to make sure
that the web is serving humanity. Not just by keeping it free and open, but by making sure that the things
that people build in this permissionless space are actually helping democracy” (Perrigo, 2019).
Enclosing individuals in filter bubbles and echo chambers is definitely dangerous for peace, since
living together requires knowledge of and tolerance for different views and cultures. As individuals
increasingly interact solely with groups of people with their own views, sometimes inflated by social bots,
and are manipulated with a biased version of reality, their ability to accept the presence of other cultures
and to understand them is made harder. This situation nurtures radicalisation, thus a lack of tolerance for
each other essential for peace and stability. Mahatma Gandhi, well-known for his philosophy of
nonviolence, was giving attention to openness as he said: “I do not want my house to be walled in on
all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as
freely as possible.”22
3. AI Techniques As a Way to Tackle Disinformation Online
In reaction to the alarming consequences of disinformation online, social media platforms and search
engines are increasingly requested to respond to the phenomenon, especially now in the context of the
“infodemic.”23 Consequently, various technological methods are being developed. In this regard, AI
techniques are explored both to detect false, inaccurate ormisleading content, and to regulate such content
online. An important point to consider from the outset is the inability, or inappropriateness, of AI systems
to differentiate misinformation from disinformation, which is particularly problematic regarding freedom
of expression and information, as we explain infra.
3.1. AI techniques are developed to detect disinformation online
To detect articles containing false information, which are not necessarily deepfakes, the already
mentioned technical report dealing with technology-enabled disinformation presents and analyses four
techniques (Akers et al., 2018, p. 6). First, it is possible with machine learning to train end-to-end
models using labeled data, namely articles containing false information and articles containing accurate
information. The system is then able to directly differentiate between these two types of articles.
However, besides the large amounts of labeled data necessary for such a model to be operational, which
can be tricky to obtain, its output would lack explainability and would be affected by biases in the
22Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, 1921.
23 See infra. The term “infodemic” is defined in note 5.
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datasets. Second, the detection of factual inaccuracies may be more effective. It can be done by
comparing the content of the article with external evidence, but this task is better performed by human
fact checkers because the nuances of natural language are difficult to formalize. It can nonetheless also
be done by verifying if a claim is backed up by given sources, or by using unstructured external web
information. Third, the detection of misleading style—inferring the intent of an article by analyzing its
style—can be done by trained human experts or through machine learning. However, the presence or
absence of misleading style is not always correlated with the inaccuracy or veracity of the provided
information. Fourth, the analysis of metadata (e.g., the sharer’s profile or attributes …) instead of the
article’s content as such is also investigated.
As highlighted by Chris Marsden and Trisha Meyer, textual analysis programs trained to identify
potential disinformation material are prone to false negatives or positives “due to the difficulty of parsing
multiple, complex and possibly conflictingmeanings emerging from the text” (Marsden andMeyer, 2019,
pp. 1–2). It has also been noted that as of 2018, Facebook’s AI systems did not have enough training data
to be highly effective outside of English and Portuguese (Marsden and Meyer, 2019, p. 17). Accurate
detection of articles containing false, inaccurate or misleading information therefore still requires the
intervention of human agents.
To detect deepfakes in particular, different techniques have been envisaged as well. A first one is to
develop technologies capable of distinguishing between fake content and real content. To this end, it is
possible to use algorithms similar to those which generated the deepfake.24 The use of forensic tools can
also be considered. Researchers observed in 2018 that actors in AI-generated videos did not blink due to
the lack of faces with closed eyes in most training datasets. Technologies looking for abnormal patterns of
eyelid movement were thus developed. However, once this method became public, new deepfake videos
were adapted by featuring blinking people (Kertysova, 2018, p. 71; Walorska, 2020, p. 24). A second
technique that has been envisaged to detect deepfakes is the authentication of content before it spreads: if
images, audios, and videos can be digitally labeled at themoment of their creation, this label could be used
as a reference to comparewith suspected fake content (Kertysova, 2018, p. 71). However, deepfakes could
be created with pre-existing unlabelled content, which would make this approach inefficient in our
opinion. For the record, the “authenticated alibi service” is a third technological approach that would
monitor and store all individual’s locations, movements, and actions in order to prove where each
individual was and what he or she was saying or doing at any given moment (Kertysova, 2018, p. 71).
This approach is particularly undesirable as it would generatemultiple human rights’ violations, including
regarding privacy.
Given the lack of efficient means to detect deepfakes and their potential impact on the legitimacy of
online information, the Partnership on AI (PAI)25 created the AI andMedia Integrity Steering Committee
in late 2019 for developing and advising projects that strengthen mis/disinformation solutions, including
detection of manipulated and synthetic content. Its first project is the Deepfake Detection Challenge,
24 For instance, “[u]sing GLTR, a model based on the GPT-2 system […], researchers from the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab and
HarvardNLP investigated whether the same technology used to write independently fabricated articles can be used to recognize text
passages that were generated by AI. When a text passage is generated in the test application, its words are highlighted in green,
yellow, red, or purple to indicate their predictability, in decreasing order. The higher the proportion of words with low predictability,
namely sections marked in red and purple, the greater the likelihood that the passage was written by a human author. The more
predictable the words (and the ‘greener’ the text), the more likely the text was automatically generated.” Walorska (2020, p. 24).
25 The Partnership on AI “was formally established in late 2016, led by a group of AI researchers representing six of the world’s
largest technology companies: Apple, Amazon, DeepMind and Google, Facebook, IBM, and Microsoft. In 2017 the addition of six
not-for-profit Board members expanded the Partnership into a multi-stakeholder organization—which now represents a community
of 50þ member organizations.” This multistakeholder organization now “brings together academics, researchers, civil society
organizations, companies building and utilizing AI technology, and other groups working to better understand AI’s impacts. The
Partnership was established to study and formulate best practices on AI technologies, to advance the public’s understanding of AI,
and to serve as an open platform for discussion and engagement about AI and its influences on people and society.” See https://
www.partnershiponai.org/ (accessed 01 March 2021).
e32-8 Noémi Bontridder and Yves Poullet
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 26 Nov 2021 at 08:08:22, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
which aims at promoting the development of technical solutions that detect AI-generated andmanipulated
videos (for more information, see, Partnership on AI, 2020).
To detect social bots, various efforts have been made as well. As exposed in the report dealing with
technology-enabled disinformation, “[d]etection approaches commonly leverage machine learning to
find differences between human users and bot accounts. Detection models make use of the social network
graph structure, account data and posting metrics, as well as natural language processing techniques to
analyze the text content from profiles. Crowdsourcing techniques have also been attempted. From the
platforms provider’s vantage point, a promising approach relies on monitoring account behavior such as
time spent viewing posts and number of friend requests sent” (Akers et al., 2018, p. 5). It can be observed
that AI techniques have been more successful to detect fake accounts, including bot accounts. Indeed,
99.6% of Facebook’s fake accounts actioned in the fourth quarter of 2020 were found and flagged by the
company before users reported them.26
3.2. AI techniques are developed to regulate content online
AI techniques can also be used to aid regulation of content and accounts online. The following methods
are discussed in the report prepared by Marsden and Meyer at the request of the STOA (Marsden and
Meyer, 2019, pp. 38–41). Filtering of content is a measure undertaken by technical providers to prevent
the upload or posting of content, and removal of content is undertaken upon awareness, request, or order.
Filtering or removal of content is a particularly effective method to tackle disinformation, but also the
most invasive one as it prevents content sharing. Blocking of content is a method by which the user’s
access to the content is blocked. However, this method can be circumvented by employing a virtual
private network (VPN). (De)prioritization of content can either be done by the user who opts to see less
content related to particular persons or subjects, or by utilizing automated ranking through algorithms and
network-based solutions. Disabling and suspension of accounts is another method that can be used to
tackle disinformation online. Technology providers take these measures when their users abuse the terms
of service or do not respect legislation. As is well-known and disputable, Twitter and Facebook have for
instance suspended Donald Trump’s account for having violated the platforms’ terms and conditions.27
Other innovative technologies that may prevent disinformation are being developed, such as decen-
tralized web (Dweb) technologies. Indeed, Dweb technologies “would enable us to break down the
immense databases that are currently held centrally by internet companies rather than users (hence the
decentralized web). In principle, this would also better protect users from private and government
surveillance as data would no longer be stored in a way that was easy for third parties to access. This
actually harks back to the original philosophy behind the internet, which was first created to decentralize
US communications during the Cold War to make them less vulnerable to attack.”28
3.3. Ethical implications
Even if the intended purpose behind the development of AI techniques in response to the ambient
disinformation may be legitimate, their use does not escape from multiple ethical concerns either. Taking
them into account is of paramount importance before deploying such techniques in the digital ecosystem.
26 Facebook, “Community Standards Enforcement Report,” https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforce
ment#fake-accounts (accessed 01 March 2021).
27 Twitter, “Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump” (8 January 2021). https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/
2020/suspension.html (accessed 01 March 2021); Facebook, “Referring Former President Trump’s Suspension From Facebook to
the Oversight Board” (21 January 2021). https://about.fb.com/news/2021/01/referring-trump-suspension-to-oversight-board/
(accessed 01 March 2021).
28 Harbinja andKaragiannopoulos (2019); “Whenwe currently access the web, our computers use the HTTP protocol in the form
of web addresses to find information stored at a fixed location, usually on a single server. In contrast, the DWeb would find
information based on its content, meaning it could be stored inmultiple places at once. As a result, this form of the web also involves
all computers providing services as well as accessing them, known as peer-to-peer connectivity.”
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First, the use of AI systems to detect disinformation material requires an agreed formal definition of
what disinformation encompasses. Yet, defining the problem is not always straightforward (Hanot and
Michel, 2020, pp. 157–161; Poullet, 2020c). and raises questions regarding who is the judge in
determining what is legal or illegal and desirable or undesirable in society. Distinguishing satire,
propaganda, and hoaxes from disinformation may be problematic, and some definitions include these
kinds of content in the disinformation problem.As outlined by the EuropeanCourt ofHumanRights in the
leading caseHandyside v. UnitedKingdom, freedomof expression “is applicable not only to ‘information’
or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society.’ This means,
amongst other things that every ‘formality,’ ‘condition,’ ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”29 Furthermore, the scope of the problem is
questionable. As a matter of fact, the lack of access to accurate information goes beyond the disinfor-
mation problem. Misinformation also affects society as a whole, and most people sharing content are
unaware of the initial intention of the source’s publisher. However, tackling misinformation would
dramatically limit freedom of expression and information, as we have already mentioned.
Yet, difficulty particularly arises when it comes to distinguish misinformation from disinformation, as
the intent of the sharer needs to be determined to that end. As explained in this section, AI techniques
developed to tackle disinformation online detect all false, inaccurate or misleading information with no
distinction related to the intent of the sharer. Permitting AI systems to regulate content automatically
would therefore seriously affect freedom of expression and information. This is the case even when
humans are involved in the process, since they may rely on the output given by the AI system. We can
pursue our reflection by questioning the possibility to enable AI systems to assess the malicious intent of
the sharer. Well, since the intention of a person creating or spreading content can be unclear, it would be
particularly difficult to enable a machine to assess the intent behind a shared content with the degree of
certainty that the delicate action of moderation should require.
To express false, inaccurate or misleading information is indeed not per se condemnable. What is
reprehensible is by no means related to the quality of the shared content but rather the malicious use of
technology to expand voluntarily false, inaccurate, or misleading information in order to manipulate
people. AI techniques might thus be used precisely to detect this malicious use of technology (e.g., AI-
generated content, the use of recommender systems to target content at specific individuals with a
malicious intent, the use of social bots) but not to assess the information’s quality. The Council of the
EU indeed concluded that “with regard to the importance of freedom of speech, states and administrative
regulatory authorities as well as private platform providers should abstain from defining quality content or
the reliability of content itself.”30
In addition, Marsden and Meyer underline that “it is not clear how often and under which circum-
stances ex ante filtering or blocking take place on the platforms. Some is machine-driven, but it is unclear
how the illegality of the content or its violation with the community guidelines is determined, nor what
safeguards are in place to prevent over-censoring of content.”31 Yet, transparency of content regulation is
primordial in order to assess its legality, especially regarding freedom of expression. Explainability of any
content regulation is therefore required, and the complexity of AI systems’ functioning is problematic in
this regard, as it may lead to opaque outputs.
The Information for All Programme32 of UNESCO had already highlighted a decade ago that while
technologies “can open channels by which information may be shared and opinions expressed; it can also
29 ECtHR, Handyside v. United Kingdom (Judgment) [1976] Application n°5493/72, para 49.
30 Council of the European Union (2020, para 39). It adds that “[t]his should not prevent platforms from promoting public
communications and announcements in case of crisis or emergency situations.”
31 SeeMarsden andMeyer (2019, p. 45). In this regard, we specify that algorithms deployed by platforms can be quite explainable
(machine learning) or, by contrast, quite inexplainable (so-called “black box AI”).
32 https://en.unesco.org/programme/ifap.
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be used to restrict the information available and to identify and interfere with people expressing alternative
opinions” (Rundle and Conley, 2007, p. 15). They specified that “the right to freedom of opinion and
expression loses valuewithout the ability to communicate one’s views to others. ICTs can be used to create
a public forumwhere this communication can take place, or it can restrict expression by placing limits on a
person’s ability to communicate with others” (Rundle and Conley, 2007, pp. 15–16). Albeit the current
digital ecosystem generates the necessity to place some limits on one’s opportunities to manipulate
individuals, programming algorithms to tackle false, inaccurate ormisleading informationwould limit the
individuals’ ability to express freely their opinion, which is inadmissible, how factually questionable
those opinions may be, regarding the fundamental rights to freedom of expression and information
necessary for democracy and without which we would readily evolve toward a totalitarian society
resembling to the one described by George Orwell in his well-known dystopian novel.
Furthermore, as we have already mentioned, AI systems trained to detect false, inaccurate, or
misleading information are prone to false positives and false negatives. False positives, namely the
wrongful detection of false, inaccurate, or misleading content, affect freedom of expression. Indeed, they
“could lead to over-censorship of legitimate content that is machine-labeled incorrectly as
disinformation” (Marsden andMeyer, 2019, p. 17). On the other hand, false positives and false negatives
would both generate discriminations, therefore impacting equality and nondiscrimination.33 These can be
generated by bias in the algorithms. For instance, we indicated above that Facebook’s algorithms lack
training data outside of English and Portuguese. Therefore, we can assume that content shared in any other
language is less prone to be detected by AI systems. This would generate an asymmetrical approach to the
disinformation problem.
Other concerns emerge when AI techniques are used to automatically regulate content. For instance,
the use of content ranking algorithms can pose problems regarding media pluralism when it relies on the
prioritization of “authoritative sources.” Indeed, such a method makes it particularly difficult for new
brands to emerge, and it can affect the plurality of voices (Marsden and Meyer, 2019, p. 45). These
concerns jibe with the ones exposed above regarding the importance of protecting freedom of expression
and information by abstaining from defining the quality or reliability of content.
While all ethical implications regarding AI techniques developed to tackle disinformation online
must be carefully considered, it is still important to bear in mind that human moderators need to cope
with a very hard job. In May 2020, Facebook agreed to pay 52 million dollars to 11,250 moderators
who had developed post-traumatic stress disorder from looking at the worst of the internet (The
Economist, 2020b). Moreover, human review is prone to error or ambiguous results as well, and biases
also affect the human mind. The right not to be subject to a decision solely based on automated
processing.34 is however relevant in this regard, and AI techniques used to tackle disinformation may
put a publisher in this situation.
In parallel, the disinformation problem goes beyond search engines and platforms. Indeed, instant
messaging platforms are also efficient means to spread disinformation “since they enable the sharing of
content within closed groupswith large numbers of users as well as the transfer of content from one closed
group to another.”35 The murders in India mentioned above illustrate this issue. However, tackling
disinformation in private messages would also raise significant concerns regarding the right to privacy.
33 Equality before the law and the prohibition of discriminations are set out in articles 1 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, in article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and in article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union.
34 This right is protected in the EU under article 22 of the GDPR.
35 European Commission (2020a). The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services noted that “[e]ven though
theymay be defined as ‘instant messaging tools’more than ‘platforms’,WhatsApp andMessenger allow the users to share content in
closed groups that may contain an enormous amount of people, and offer simple functions to transfer messages/content from one
group to another, thus making the content very easily viral. From this point of view, therefore, instant messaging tools may become
very efficient tools to spread disinformation.” ERGA (2020, p. 44, note 56).
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4. The EU Regulation of Disinformation
The alarming consequences of the disinformation phenomenon online have prompted the EU institutions
to initiate a regulatory framework to address the problem. That framework first represented a form of
ascending (or “bottom-up”) co-regulation, but it is now being reshaped into descending (or “top-down”)
co-regulation, predominantly through the Digital Services Act proposed by the Commission. While this
new proposal focuses on themoderation of content circulating on online platforms, the EU parliament and
the EU Council advocate for more positive measures aiming at enhancing media literacy and access to
accurate information.
4.1. From ascending co-regulation …
Following a public consultation launched in 2017 revealing that over 97% of nearly 3,000
respondents were considering that they had already faced fake news (European Commission,
2018c), the European Commission set up in January 2018 a high-level group of experts (HLEG)
to advise on policy initiatives to counter fake news and disinformation spread online. The report
delivered by the HLEG (European Commission, 2018a). recommends the adoption of a controlled
self-regulatory approach to address the problem. The European Commission Communication
“Tackling online disinformation: a European approach” (European Commission, 2018d). does not
deviate from this solution, and provides four principles and objectives that should guide action to
tackle disinformation: “First, to improve transparency regarding the origin of information and the
way it is produced, sponsored, disseminated, and targeted in order to enable citizens to assess the
content they access online and to reveal possible attempts to manipulate opinion. Second, to promote
diversity of information, in order to enable citizens to make informed decisions based on critical
thinking, through support to high quality journalism, media literacy, and the rebalancing of the
relation between information creators and distributors. Third, to foster credibility of information by
providing an indication of its trustworthiness, notably with the help of trusted flaggers, and by
improving traceability of information and authentication of influential information providers. Fourth,
to fashion inclusive solutions. Effective long-term solutions require awareness-raising, more media
literacy, broad stakeholder involvement and the cooperation of public authorities, online platforms,
advertisers, trusted flaggers, journalists, and media groups” (European Commission, 2018d, p. 6).
In reaction to this EU position and following strictly the self-regulatory approach, representatives of the
largest online platforms (Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Mozilla) and trade associations of advertisers
presented aCode of Practice onDisinformation. The Commission, which had limited choice for alternative
action, endorsed it in September 2018 (European Commission, 2018b). Microsoft and TikTok have also
signed the code since.36 It gathers commitments that the signatories can individually undertake and will
address in good faith. These commitments relate to: 1° scrutiny of ad placements; 2° identification of
political advertising and of issue-based advertising; 3° integrity of services through policies regarding bots
and the use of automated systems; 4° empowerment of consumers by prioritizing authentic information,
facilitating their evaluation of content via tools like indicators of trustworthiness, improving the findability
of diverse perspectives about topics of public interest, and supporting efforts aimed at improving critical
thinking and media literacy; 5° empowerment of research aimed at understanding the disinformation
phenomenon and its impact. The Code also includes an annex containing best practices that signatories
will apply to implement their commitments. The signatories further commit to publish annually a report on
the different measures they undertake related to their specific commitments. This report must include, inter
alia, indicators providing transparency regarding the scale of the disinformation problem, the submitted
complaints, and the provided solutions.
The Code of Practice on disinformation represents a form of co-regulation that we name “ascending”
since the initiative comes from private actors, the content has been decided by signatories and the execution
36Microsoft signed the Code in May 2019 and TikTok in June 2020.
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is marginally controlled by public authorities through the review of the report by the Commission. In
September 2018, the Sounding Board of the Multistakeholder Forum on Disinformation, which gathers
representatives of the media, civil society, fact checkers and academia, had already expressed its skepticism
regarding the “so-calledCode of Practice” (SoundingBoard, 2018). Its concerns are nowmostly confirmed,
as the recent assessment of theCode (EuropeanCommission, 2020a). exposes various shortcomings of such
self-regulation: disparity between the reports and the measures undertaken by the signatories; lack of
coverage of the sector; lack of participation of some key platforms (such as WhatsApp); lack of an
independent oversight mechanism and of cooperation mechanisms; lack of access to data necessary to
verify the signatories’ practices; lack of consequences in case of breach; and lack of protection of
fundamental rights, including through mechanisms for redress. This assessment therefore paves the way
for a “descending” co-regulatory approach.
4.2. … Toward descending co-regulation
TheDigital ServicesAct,37 a newproposal for a Regulation presented inDecember 2020 by theCommission,
proposes such a co-regulatory approach to tackle the disinformation problem, providing for a co-regulatory
backstop for the measures that should be included in the revised and strengthened Code of Practice on
Disinformation.38 The revised and strengthened Code of Practice will build on the guidance of the
Commission,39 as announced in the European Democracy Action Plan (European Commission, 2020b).
The declared purpose of the proposal is to enhance platforms’ accountability by requiring them to assume
their responsibility for the actions they take and the systemic risks they pose, in order to build a safe digital
spacewhere fundamental rights of all users of digital services are protected. The proposal provides for specific
mechanisms and measures to tackle illegal content but does not define harmful content that is not illegal and
does not subject it to removal obligations, while further prohibiting general monitoring obligations.40
Nevertheless, and this is of particular interest for our study, some provisions relate to content moderation
as such and to algorithmic systems that shape information flows online, which we specify here below.
Some transparency obligations are imposed on all providers of intermediary services41: they “shall
include information on any restrictions that they impose in relation to the use of their service in respect of
37 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For
Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (15 December 2020) 2020/0361 (COD).
38 Digital Services Act, Article 35 and recitals 68 and 69.
39 The guidance was published onMay 26, 2021. European Commission (2021). “The Guidance calls for reinforcing the Code of
Practice on Disinformation in the following areas to ensure a complete and consistent application across stakeholders and EU
countries:
– Larger participation with tailored commitments.
– Better demonetising of disinformation.
– Ensuring the integrity of services.
– Improving the empowerment of users.
– Increasing the coverage of fact-checking and providing increased access to data to researchers.
– Creating a more robust monitoring framework.
The signatories of the Code of Practice should convene to strengthen the Code in line with the Commission’s guidance and
present a first draft in autumn.”
We will analyse this new document in another contribution.
40 Digital Services Act, Article 7.
41 “‘Intermediary service’ means one of the following services:
– a ‘mere conduit’ service that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient
of the service, or the provision of access to a communication network;
– a ‘caching’ service that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the
service, involving the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, for the sole purpose ofmakingmore
efficient the information’s onward transmission to other recipients upon their request;
– a ‘hosting’ service that consists of the storage of information provided by, and at the request of, a recipient of the service”
Digital Services Act, Article 2(f).
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information provided by the recipients of the service, in their terms and conditions. That information shall
include information on any policies, procedures, measures and tools used for the purpose of content
moderation, including algorithmic decision-making and human review.”42 They also have to annually
report on any content moderation they engage in.43 The transparency reporting obligations are expanded
for online platforms,44 which must include in their report information on “any use made of automatic
means for the purpose of content moderation, including a specification of the precise purposes, indicators
of the accuracy of the automated means in fulfilling those purposes and any safeguards applied;”45 and
very large online platforms46 see their reporting obligations further expanded.47
Where a hosting service decides to remove or disable access to specific information provided by a
recipient of the service, it must inform the recipient and provide a clear and specific statement of reasons.
That statement contains, “where applicable, information on the use made of automated means in taking the
decision, includingwhere the decisionwas taken in respect of content detected or identified using automated
means,” but also information on the redress possibilities,48 which should always include judicial redress.49
These decisions and statement of reasons must also be published in a publicly available dataset managed by
the Commission.50 Following a decision taken by an online platform (to remove or disable access to
information, to suspend or terminate the provision of the service to a recipient, or to suspend or terminate the
recipient’s account, on the ground that the information provided by the recipient is illegal or incompatible
with their terms and conditions), internal complaint handling systems meeting certain conditions must be
provided for,51 but also possibility of out-of-court dispute settlement by independent certified bodies.52
Regarding advertisingmethods, online platforms have some basic transparency obligations. First, they
“shall ensure that the recipients of the service can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed to
each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous manner and in real time: (a) that the information
displayed is an advertisement; (b) the natural or legal person on whose behalf the advertisement is
displayed; and (c) meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to
whom the advertisement is displayed.”53 Second, in addition to those, very large online platforms are also
required to ensure public access to repositories containing information on the advertisements they display
on their online interface.54 Such repositories are requested in order to “facilitate supervision and research
into emerging risks brought about by the distribution of advertising online, for example in relation to […]
manipulative techniques and disinformation with a real and foreseeable negative impact on public health,
public security, civil discourse, political participation and equality.”55
Very large online platforms (platforms providing their services tominimum10%of the EU population)
are also required to set out, in their terms and conditions, the main parameters used in their recommender
systems (when they use such systems), in an easily comprehensible manner to ensure that the recipients
42 Digital Services Act, Article 12.
43 Digital Services Act, Article 13.
44 “‘Online platform’ means a provider of a hosting service which, at the request of a recipient of the service, stores and
disseminates to the public information, unless that activity is aminor and purely ancillary feature of another service and, for objective
and technical reasons cannot be used without that other service, and the integration of the feature into the other service is not ameans
to circumvent the applicability of this Regulation.” Digital Services Act, Article 2(h).
45 Digital Services Act, Article 23 §1(c).
46 Very large platforms are platforms providing their services to a number of averagemonthly active recipients of the service in the
EU equal or higher than 10% of the EU population (currently amounting to 45 million). Digital Services Act, Article 25.
47 Digital Services Act, Article 33.
48 Digital Services Act, Article 15 §1–2.
49 Digital Services Act, recital 42.
50 Digital Services Act, Article 15 §4.
51 Digital Services Act, Article 17.
52 Digital Services Act, Article 18.
53 Digital Services Act, Article 24.
54 Digital Services Act, Article 30.
55 Digital Services Act, Recital 63.
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understand how information is prioritized for them, and to provide the recipients with the option tomodify
or influence such parameters, including at least one option that is not based on profiling.56
Furthermore, risk assessments and mitigation measures are required from very large online platforms.
They are requested to identify, analyse and assess the significant systemic risks stemming from the
functioning and use made of their services in the EU.57 In this regard, some categories of risks must be
assessed in-depth. Among these risks, the regulation proposal underlines the negative effects for the exercise
of the fundamental rights, which “may arise […] in relation to the design of the algorithmic systems used by
the very large online platforms, or the misuse of their service through […] methods for silencing speech or
hampering competition;”58 and, secondly, the intentional manipulation of their service, which “may arise
[…] through the creation of fake accounts, the use of bots, and other automated or partially automated
behaviors, whichmay lead to the rapid andwidespread dissemination of information that is illegal content or
incompatible with an online platform’s terms and conditions.”59 When conducting risk assessments, these
very large online platforms are required to “take into account, in particular, how their content moderation
systems, recommender systems and systems for selecting and displaying advertisement influence any of the
systemic risks […], including the potentially rapid and wide dissemination of illegal content and of
information that is incompatible with their terms and conditions.”60 They must then take measures to
mitigate the identified risks, such as adapting content moderation or recommender systems.61
In order to ensure compliance of very large online platforms with their obligations laid down in the
regulation, such platforms have to appoint compliance officers,62 and provide the Digital Services
Coordinator63 of the establishment or the Commission with access to or reporting of specific data upon
request.64 An independent audit is also foreseen, only for very large online platforms,65 “given the need to
ensure verification by independent experts.”66
We finally outline that the proposal allows the Commission to initiate the drawing up of crisis protocols
“for addressing crisis situations strictly limited to extraordinary circumstances affecting public security or
public health,”67 in order to “coordinate a rapid, collective and cross-border response in the online
environment.”68 It specifies that “[e]xtraordinary circumstances may entail any unforeseeable event, such
as earthquakes, hurricanes, pandemics and other serious cross-border threats to public health, war and acts
of terrorism,where, for example, online platformsmay bemisused for the rapid spread of illegal content or
disinformation or where the need arises for rapid dissemination of reliable information.”69
4.3. The Commission’s omissions regarding important issues
From our analysis of the regulation proposal, we observe three points to which the Commission should
have given more attention.
First, the proposal does not differentiate sufficiently the disinformation problem from the moderation
of illegal content. The adopted approach regarding harmful content that is not per se illegal is question-
able: while there was an agreement amongst stakeholders to not define such content and to not subject it to
removal obligations “as this is a delicate area with severe implications for the protection of freedom of
56Digital Services Act, Article 29 and Recital 62.
57 Digital Services Act, Article 26 §1.
58 Digital Services Act, Recital 57.
59 Digital Services Act, Recital 57.
60 Digital Services Act, Article 26 §2.
61 Digital Services Act, Article 27.
62 Digital Services Act, Article 32.
63 See Digital Services Act, Articles 39 and 41.
64 Digital Services Act, Article 31 and Recital 64.
65 Digital Services Act, Article 28.
66 Digital Services Act, Recital 60.
67 Digital Services Act, Article 37.
68 Digital Services Act, Recital 71.
69 Digital Services Act, Recital 71.
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expression,”70 providers of intermediary services are allowed to decide what content to moderate as they
can impose restrictions in relation to the use of their service, as long as they inscribe those in their terms
and conditions.71 Then, they have to respect all their other obligations provided for in the proposal’s
provisions we outlined just above, which apply in a nondiscriminatory manner to all content moderation
irrespective of the content’s type. As we have already mentioned, it is for instance because Trump would
have violated Twitter’s and Facebook’s terms and conditions that his accounts were permanently
suspended by the platforms.72 Admittedly, the regulation proposal provides for various transparency
measures and requests the setting up of redress possibilities, but is it admissible to let private companies
decide which content should be moderated, if we consider the overarching importance of freedom of
expression? Facebook itself would prefer to make decisions about whether content is harmful “according
to frameworks agreed by democratically accountable lawmakers.”73 In this context, wewish to clarify that
false, inaccurate or misleading content is not the main element of the disinformation problem. What is
truly and legally problematic is the manipulation of individuals’ opinions, which is achieved cogently by
leveraging the current digital ecosystem, as we demonstrated in Section 2.
Second, the proposal provides for enhanced responsibilities for very large online platforms given their
importance “due to their reach, in particular as expressed in number of recipients of the service, in facilitating
public debate, economic transactions and the dissemination of information, opinions and ideas and in
influencing how recipients obtain and communicate information online,”74 and because such platforms
“may cause societal risks, different in scope and impact from those caused by smaller platforms.”75 As
indicated above, the proposal specifies that such risks may stem from the use of algorithmic systems, the
creation of fake accounts, or the use of automated behaviors such as bots.76 In this context, it appears that
such platforms are providing an essential service: they permit communication and reception of information
online. Such essential service could be considered as a public or, at least, universal service like the service
given by telecommunications’ operators. Indeed, the proposal further acknowledges that such platforms
“are used in away that strongly influences safety online, the shaping of public opinion and discourse, aswell
as on online trade. The way they design their services is generally optimized to benefit their often
advertising-driven business models and can cause societal concerns. In the absence of effective regulation
and enforcement, they can set the rules of the game, without effectively identifying and mitigating the risks
and the societal and economic harm they can cause.”77
Third, wewish to underline that the Commission’s self-conferred possibility to initiate the drawing up of
crisis protocols in case of emergenciesmay be particularly problematic regarding freedom of expression and
freedom of information, if applied. This provision has certainly been included in reaction to the many
problems related to the infodemic stemming from the Covid-19. The infodemic is sure enough problematic,
but what generates this infodemic? The digital ecosystem, again, as we explained in Section 2.2. Certainly,
ensuring that reliable information is always available and evenmore during a time of crisis is legitimate, but
content provided by the government should not silence people’s voices, and we fear that the enforcement of
crisis protocols would have such a consequence. The right approachwould be to tackle the misuse of online
platforms to spread disinformation, suchmisuse being furthermore one of the reasons for theCommission to
include this tendentious provision.78 It is however relevant to note that tackling such misuse and providing
people with reliable information are always necessary, not only in times of crisis.
70 Digital Services Act, p. 9.
71 Digital Services Act, Article 12.
72 Twitter, “Permanent suspension of @realDonaldTrump” (note 27); Facebook, “Referring Former President Trump’s Suspen-
sion From Facebook to the Oversight Board” (note 27).
73 Facebook, “Referring Former President Trump’s Suspension From Facebook to the Oversight Board” (note 27).
74 Digital Services Act, Recital 53.
75 Digital Services Act, Recital 54.
76 Digital Services Act, Recital 57.
77 Digital Services Act, Recital 56.
78 Digital Services Act, Recital 71.
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4.4. A more positive approach by the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU
On its part, the European Parliament adopted in November 2020 a resolution on strengthening media
freedom: protection of journalists in Europe, hate speech, disinformation and the role of platforms
(European Parliament, 2020). This resolution focuses precisely on the right to freedom of expression
and information and on democracy (European Parliament, 2020, para A), therefore adopting a more
adequate approach to tackle the disinformation problem. It first draws attention to the essential role of
the media and investigative journalists. Accordingly, the Resolution underlines the need to preserve
their freedom and pluralism by, inter alia, maintaining their independence from political or govern-
mental interference (European Parliament, 2020, paras 6–7); promoting measures aimed at financing
and supporting media and independent journalism (European Parliament, 2020, paras 3, 21); protecting
journalists and media workers (European Parliament, 2020, paras 10–12); avoiding media ownership
concentration (European Parliament, 2020, para 16); and supporting the development of a vibrant and
pluralistic media landscape through a EU media action plan (European Parliament, 2020, para 20).
Regarding the role of platforms in countering disinformation, it emphasizes the requirement to avoid
any drift to monopoly or concentration of information sources and over-censorship or removal
(European Parliament, 2020, paras 35, 37); it promotes collaboration between fact checkers, academic
researchers and stakeholders to identify, analyse and expose potential disinformation threats (European
Parliament, 2020, para 40); it pleads for joint action to counter disinformation and underlines the key
role that platforms should play to that end (European Parliament, 2020, para 41) in a transparent and
accountable manner (European Parliament, 2020, para 42). Finally, the document stresses that “using
automated tools in content moderation may endanger freedom of expression and information” (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2020, para 43), and, therefore, encourages the creation of tools to enable users to report
and flag potential disinformation, and the review by independent and impartial third-party fact-
checking organizations (European Parliament, 2020, para 45). Meanwhile, it also highlights, in line
with our statements above, that “online platforms are part of the online public space in which public
debate take place” (European Parliament, 2020, para 35); and that the business models based on micro-
targeting advertising may generate negative impacts (European Parliament, 2020, para 39). The
resolution also calls for measures to increase effectively media literacy (European Parliament, 2020,
paras 46–49), which is essential as regards the growing flow of information online.
This resolution thus points out many important issues and promotes measures that are essential to
enhance freedom of expression and information. Of particular value in light of our study are also the
Parliamentary call on the Commission “to engage further with digital platforms [regarding the right of
individuals not to be subject to pervasive online tracking across sites and applications] and to step up
efforts to enforce the prohibition of such practices, combat the strategic, automated amplification of
disinformation through the use of bots and fake profiles online, and increase transparency with respect to
the financing and distribution of online advertising,” and its call on all online platforms “to ensure that the
algorithms that underpin their search functions are not primarily based on advertising” (European
Parliament, 2020, para 39).
The EU Council conclusions on safeguarding a free and pluralistic media system (Council of the
European Union, 2020), also adopted in November 2020, add some primordial points on sustainability,
pluralism and trustworthiness, three of which we underline here as they were not already present is such
clear terms elsewhere, and may address some of the main issues we pointed out regarding the spread of
disinformation through the digital ecosystem. First, in order to enhance the user’s autonomy, the Council
concludes that “offers of personalized content should be based on criteria which have been provided
voluntarily and/or selected by the user” (Council of the EuropeanUnion, 2020, para 21). Second, it invites
the Commission to “prevent public harm by addressing the manipulative dissemination techniques of
disinformation” (Council of the European Union, 2020, para 42). Third and as already cited, it agrees that
“with regard to the importance of freedom of speech, states and administrative regulatory authorities as
well as private platform providers should abstain from defining quality content or the reliability of content
itself” (Council of the European Union, 2020, para 39).
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5. Conclusion
Though disinformation is a long-standing problem, AI systems present in the current digital ecosystem of the
web participate in the problem’s aggravation predominantly in two ways. First, they can be leveraged by
malicious stakeholders in order to manipulate individuals in a particularly effective manner and at a huge
scale. Secondly, they directly amplify the spread of such content. These AI systems are programmed to
enhance engagement, and therefore themain contributing factor to the spreadofdisinformation is thebusiness
model of the web. Besides that, social media bots are widespread, and fake content is increasingly realistic.
In reaction to all negative effects of disinformation on society, and particularly in the context of the
Covid-19 pandemic, social media platforms and search engines are increasingly requested to act against
the spread of disinformation online. As a consequence, many AI systems are developed to tackle the
problem. Yet, the use of AI systems to tackle disinformation content, the dissemination of which is
amplified by other AI systems, is not a miraculous solution and would generate additional concerns.79
Manipulative means should be impaired since they endanger many ethical values commonly shared at the
international level, but in doing so, the risks incurred by ethical values and fundament rights, especially by
freedom of expression and freedom to receive information, need particular attention.
As there is a clear tension between moderation of content online and free speech, the use of AI systems
for such moderation would be particularly problematic. The European Commission’s initiatives lack
some perspectives in this regard, as they provide for transparency and redress measures but do not provide
for any definition of harmful content that should be moderated by online platforms. Abstaining from
defining such content is partially in line with the EU Council’s conclusions, which properly outline that
public regulatory authorities should not define the quality of content or its reliability, but platforms neither
(Council of the European Union, 2020, para 39). Yet, while public authorities renounce any censorship,
private platforms do not.
In our opinion, a more constructive approach would be to change the current digital ecosystem in light
of the problems it generates. AI systems present in this ecosystem should indeed be adapted toward the
respect of fundamental rights and ethical values. Adapting the business model of the Web would be an
integral part of this process because as long as platforms and search engines count on the remuneration
received from advertisers, engagement of the users may be aimed. Moving to a subscriber-based or pay-
to-pay model for media and communication may not be the solution to advocate for, but the platforms’
tendency to constantly increase revenues from advertisers by seeking users’ engagement is dispropor-
tionate as regards the consequences of such practices. The obligation, included in the regulation proposal,
for very large online platforms to provide their users with the possibility to modify or influence the
parameters used in the platform’s recommender systems, including at least one option which is not based
on profiling,80 is particularly relevant in this regard. The Draft Recommendation of the Council of Europe
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data in the context of profiling81
goes along the same line, requesting from online intermediary services to “give data subjects both the
possibility to opt in as regards the profiling and the choice between the different profiling purposes or
degrees.”
In order to enhance access to accurate information while respecting freedom of expression and
information, support for media and journalists is needed, as the EU Parliament claims it. Media
pluralism is indeed of particular importance. The establishment of a public information service
providing citizens with controlled information can also be envisaged, but should by no means hamper
the individuals’ capacity to share their opinions or the media pluralism to be effective. We add that
79 Furthermore, as noted by Mireille Hildebrandt, assuming that such systems can do without the acuity of human judgement
would amount to “mistaking the imitation for what is imitated.” Hildebrandt (2018).
80 Digital Services Act, Article 29 and Recital 62.
81 Council of Europe (Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law), Consultative Committee of the Convention for the
protection on individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data—Convention 108, “Draft Recommendation on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data in the context of profiling (revising Recommendation (2010)
13)” (19 February 2021).
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while content moderation through AI systems is not the right approach, such systems may still be used
to counter the manipulation of the digital ecosystem, including through the accurate detection of AI-
generated content, of social media bots, or through the detection of the malicious use of micro-
targeting systems to target disinformation content at each user. It is indeed not the content itself that
must be tackled, but rather the malicious use of technologies to amplify the conveyed message.
Besides all these measures, media literacy is primordial. Indeed, while education to the critical
evaluation of information has always been essential, it has substantially gained in importance with
the growing flow of information permitted by our data-driven world. Freedom of expression, freedom
of information, media pluralism, media literacy… all these are needed for democracy’s preservation—
or, may we say, for its revival.
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